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ABSTRACT
We exploit exogenous variation in legal status following the January 2007 European Union
enlargement to estimate its effect on immigrant crime. We difference out unobserved timevarying factors by 1) comparing recidivism rates of immigrants from the “new” and “candidate”
member countries and 2) using arrest data on foreign detainees released upon a mass clemency
that occurred in Italy in August 2006. The timing of the two events allows us to set up a
difference-in-differences strategy. Legal status leads to a 50 percent reduction in recidivism and
explains one-half to two-thirds of the observed differences in crime rates between legal and
illegal immigrants.
JEL codes: F22, K42, C41
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INTRODUCTION
In most developed countries the connection between immigration and crime is a heavily
debated issue. Specifically, opinion surveys show that in North America and Europe citizens are
deeply concerned about the perceived link between crime and immigrants, especially illegal ones
(Mayda 2006; Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2009). We argue that part of the debate might be
driven by a vicious cycle between crime, citizens’ perceptions, and migration restrictions.
Citizens may easily base their perceptions about the relationship between immigration
and crime on the disproportionate presence of immigrants in Western prisons (see Figure 1). 1
These figures increase the support for migration restrictions, preventing potential immigrants
from legally residing in the destination country (Dinas and van Spanje 2011; Waters and Simes
2013). However, stringent restrictions produce a pool of unauthorized immigrants—those who
cross the border illegally or simply overstay their tourist visas. 2 Migration restrictions are often
coupled with work restrictions. Illegal immigrants are thus precluded from taking legal jobs and
from receiving welfare benefits, which in turn would lower their opportunity cost of committing
crimes. If this increases their criminal attitude and their likelihood of being imprisoned, the
vicious cycle begins.
Whether there is such a cycle depends on the causal relationship between immigrants’ legal
status and crime. In principle the relationship can be quite complex, and before explaining how we
plan to tackle this issue, it is useful break down the total effect into three parts. Granting legal status
1

Only recently has the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released official data showing that
immigrants appear to be overrepresented in prisons and jails, not without critiques (Camarota and Vaughan 2009).
Before that, Stana (2005) had shown that foreigners are overrepresented in federal prisons, while Butcher and Piehl
(2007) had shown that, according to the U.S. Census, immigrants are underrepresented among the population of
“institutionalized” individuals, and that such population may serve as a proxy for the overall prison population.
2
In many developed countries the ratio between illegal and legal immigrants is estimated to be close to
one-third (see Fasani 2008).

1

Figure 1 Share of Foreigners Over Prison Population and Total Population in Some OECD Countries

NOTE: This figure shows the incidence of foreigners among the prison and total populations in some OECD countries in year
2000, or, when unavailable, in nearby years. The source of these data is the OECD.

may 1) increase the inflow of new immigrants from abroad, 2) prevent the deportation of those
who are already present in the country, and 3) reduce their propensity to engage in criminal
activity, thanks to better outside opportunities in the legal sector. Since 1) and 2) increase the
pool of potential criminals, the sign of the overall effect is clearly ambiguous. Moreover, only 2)
and 3) involve immigrants who are illegally residing in the country before legal status is granted.
This study will focus on estimating the effect on precisely these immigrants. The absence
of official statistics on the illegal population, and the potential selection into legal status,
constitute the main challenges to the identification of such an effect.
We address these two issues by exploiting, respectively, exogenous variation in legal
status after the European Union (EU) enlargement of January 1, 2007 (the “treatment”), and
unique data on the universe of prison inmates that were pardoned with the Collective Clemency
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Bill enacted in Italy five months before the enlargement, on August 1, 2006. As a consequence
of the sudden, massive release of prison inmates, we can track contemporaneous recidivism of
“treated” and “non-treated” immigrants during the periods before and after the enlargement
(respectively, the light and dark areas in Figures 2 and 3).The left panel of Figure 2 shows, on a
six-month frequency, the number of foreign prison inmates since 2012. The size of the foreign
prison population decreased by 7,000 units, from about 20,000 to 13,000, between June 2006 and
December 2006. This was largely a product of the pardon, which freed about 8,000 individuals in
August 2007 and a few more over the following weeks (see the right panel of Figure 2).
However, many of these individuals were soon rearrested—about 1,000 already by January 2007
(gray line).
Figure 2 Foreign Prison Population (left) and the Number of Inmates Released and Reincarcerated (right)

NOTE: The left figure plots the number of foreigners in prison since 1995, on a six-month frequency. The right panel shows the
number of foreign prison inmates released after the Collective Clemency Bill in August 2006 (left axis), as well as those reincarcerated through December 2007 (right axis). The vertical line refers to the moment of the EU enlargement.
SOURCE: Ministry of Justice.

We will focus on recidivism rates of inmates from certain countries, namely Romanians
and Bulgarians, who acquired the right to reside and work in Italy (as in most other European
countries) after the EU enlargement in January 2007. Figure 3 documents the treatment: The
number of Romanians and Bulgarians tracked down by the Italian police (and often deported)
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drops from the tens of thousands to essentially zero, while no significant change is observed for
illegal immigrants from countries that are expected to join the EU in the near future (Albania,
Montenegro, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, Kosovo, and Serbia). 3
Figure 3 Number of Tracked-Down Immigrants, and the Fraction Expelled

NOTE: Deportation data are based on Barbagli and Colombo (2010) and contain data from for Romania, Albania, Bulgaria,
Montenegro, and Turkey.

The unconditional difference-in-differences in recidivism rates of Romanians and
Bulgarians relative to a control group of inmates from candidate EU member countries, before
(August–December 2006) and after (January–June 2007) the enlargement, equals −3.2
percentage points, or −50 percent of the pretreatment recidivism (equal between the two groups).
As in most other countries, illegal residence by itself is not a criminal offense, so it cannot
explain these differences, nor can differential access to alternatives to institutionalization (e.g.,
home detention), because all recidivists have to face prison time. These results are confirmed
when we control (using both semiparametric and parametric methods) for a baseline hazard
function of time-at-risk, as well as for preenlargement differences between inmates from
Romania and Bulgaria and inmates from the EU candidate countries.

3

The data in Figure 3 are only available for Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Montenegro, and Turkey, yet the
econometric analysis will be based on the entire population of released inmates.
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It is difficult to judge the external validity of our estimate. On the one hand, former
inmates are more likely to be at the margin between legal and illegal behavior, and so it is not
surprising that recidivism studies form the bulk of the individual-level evidence in the empirical
crime literature (see, for instance, Witte [1980]; Lee and McCrary [2009]). On the other hand,
our quasi-experiment focuses on former inmates from a specific set of Eastern European
countries (mainly Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania). How representative is this group with
respect to the total population of illegal immigrants in Italy (and, possibly, in Europe)?
According to Eurostat data (Herm 2008), in 2006 Eastern Europeans represented 23 percent of
all non-EU immigrants to Europe, and Romanians represented the largest non-EU group of
immigrants to the EU. 4 While we do not argue that our estimates apply generally to any
immigrant group, the massive flows of Eastern European immigrants (particularly Romanians) to
several European countries extend the importance of our results beyond Italy.
The effects are also likely to differ depending on the value of legal status, which in turn
depends on labor market conditions and the degree of illegality in the host country. In countries
with slack labor markets or with large unofficial sectors, obtaining legal status may not be
sufficient to improve immigrants’ economic opportunities. In this respect, Italy, with its massive
economic differences between a very poor South and a very rich North, is an ideal testing
ground. Indeed, we find that recidivism falls only for economically motivated offenders, and the
reductions are larger in areas offering better legitimate income opportunities to legal immigrants.
A battery of falsification tests suggest that these results are not driven by the specific
characteristics of the control group, nor by other events occurring during the same period.
Estimates of peer effects across nationalities refute that the estimates are biased by substitution

4

Such numbers increased after the enlargement. In 2012, Romanians alone represented 7 percent of all
nonnationals living in the European Union, Albanians 3 percent, and Bulgarians 1.5 percent.
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or complementarity in crime between treated and control groups. Finally, we also discuss the
possibility of differential attrition due to mobility across the border of the newly legalized
immigrants, and we argue that mobility among Romanians and Bulgarians should have been
greater before the acquisition of legal status—thus biasing our estimates toward zero.
To put our results in perspective, we show in the next section that legal immigrants in
Italy have an 80–90 percent lower probability of being arrested compared to illegals. Therefore,
our results suggest that the causal effect of legal status accounts for between one-half and twothirds of this difference. The remaining part may be explained by selection into legal status, or a
different probability of imprisonment conditional upon having committed a crime, or both. While
these factors are kept constant across all pardoned inmates in our sample, legal and illegal
immigrants would generally differ in these respects.
This paper contributes to the literature on the social and economic effects of immigration.
Until very recently, research in this area has focused mainly on the labor market competition
between immigrants and natives (surveys include Borjas [1994]; Friedberg and Hunt [1995];
Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann [2000]; and Card [2005]), as well as the effects of
immigration on taxes (Lee and Miller 2000; Storesletten 2000; Chojnicki, Docquier, and Ragot
2005) and prices (Lach 2007; Cortes 2008). However, Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2009) show
that besides these more “economic” issues, natives’ support for migration restrictions is also (and
indeed mostly) shaped by other “compositional amenities,” among which crime plays a major
role (see also Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann [2000]).
In response to these concerns, a burgeoning literature documents the empirical
relationship between immigration and crime across local areas within the United States (Butcher
and Piehl 1998; Reid et al. 2005; Moehling and Piehl 2007; Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson 2010;
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Wadsworth 2010; Spenkuch 2011), the United Kingdom (Bell, Machin, and Fasani 2010), Italy
(Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti 2012), and Spain (Alonso-Borrego, Garoupa, and Vàzquez
2012). However, the effect of legal status on immigrants’ crime has remained largely
unexplored, despite there being ample evidence that legal status improves greatly the labor
market opportunities of immigrants (Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir 2002; Kossoudji and CobbClark 2002; Kaushal 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, and Raphael 2007; Lozano and Sorensen
2011).
We fill this gap by estimating the causal effect of legal status on crime. In doing so, our
paper complements parallel work on the consequences of the 1986 Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA), which granted legal status to unauthorized immigrants in the United States.
Baker (2011) shows that the IRCA decreased local crime rates across U.S. counties, while
Freedman, Owens, and Bohn (2013) document an increase in the number of charges filed against
Hispanic residents of San Antonio, Texas, after the expiration of the IRCA amnesty deadline.
Relative to these papers, we take advantage of a clean quasi-experimental design and of
longitudinal, individual-level data, which allow us to separate causal effects from selection.
Our results also speak to a large empirical literature on the relationship between
legitimate income opportunities and criminal careers. The existence of such a relationship is
indeed the key result of the economic model of crime (Becker 1968), and several papers found a
good deal of evidence consistent with it: a nonexhaustive list includes Witte (1980), Meyers
(1983), Grogger (1998), Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002), and Machin and Meghir (2004).
We show that even among foreign immigrants, access to better legitimate income
opportunities—through the acquisition of legal status—lowers the propensity to engage in crime.

7

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional
features of the Italian migration system that are most relevant for our analysis; Section 3
describes the natural experiment; Section 4 presents the empirical results; and Section 5
concludes.

LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS IN ITALY
Immigration in Italy is a very recent phenomenon. After centuries of massive emigration,
net inflows turned positive only in the late 1980s. During the past two decades, the number of
foreign official residents rose from less than 600,000 to 4.5 million.
Work Permits
The main way foreigners obtain legal residence in Italy is by receiving a work-related
permit; however, the application procedure greatly hampers the match between demand and
supply of foreign workers. In principle, migration law N. 189/2002 dictates that employers must
post job offers in Italian consulates worldwide. Upon finding an employer who is willing to act
as a sponsor, the prospective migrant is supposed to apply for a residence permit; if the
application makes it into the yearly migration quotas set by the government, the prospective
migrant receives a residence permit from the consulate and can finally migrate to Italy.
Given that it is almost impossible to find a sponsor without a direct contact, many
immigrants cross the border illegally (or they enter the country as tourists and overstay the
tourist visa) to search for an employer who is willing to sponsor their application. In practice,
however, the chances of later regularization after entering illegally are extremely low, because of
the tight rationing of residence permits. For instance, 170,000 permits were issued in 2007
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against more than 740,000 applicants; the following year, the number of new residence permits
decreased to 150,000, to be assigned primarily to applications left pending the year before.
The systematic mismatch between applications and quotas creates a large pool of illegal
immigrants, who have little or no chance of finding stable employment in the official sector and
regularizing their residence status. Thus, most of them remain unemployed or work for lower
wages in the unofficial economy, which in turn lowers the opportunity cost of engaging in
outright criminal activities.
Crime Rates
An official report by the Italian Ministry of Interior shows that in 2006 (just before the
EU enlargement) about 80 percent of all foreigners arrested by the police for having committed a
crime in Italy were illegally present in the country (Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs 2007, p.
360). However, to compute the crime rate of legal and illegal immigrants, one would need to
know as well the size of the two groups (i.e., the denominator of the crime rate), which may be
difficult to observe due to the very nature of illegal migration.
Still, amnesties of formerly undocumented immigrants provide useful information in this
respect. On these occasions, illegal immigrants may, in fact, apply for a valid residence permit
under very mild conditions, and thus have clear incentives to report their (illegal) status. General
amnesties have been enacted every four-to-five years since 1986, growing in size from 100,000
to 250,000 individuals during the 1990s, and reaching a peak of 700,000 in 2002. These figures
suggest that the growth of foreign residents in Italy was paralleled by that of unofficial
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immigrants, the latter representing about one-third of the total foreign population in 2002 (Figure
4). 5
Figure 4 Residence Permits, Amnesties of Illegal Immigrants, and Deportations

NOTE: The figure shows the number of valid residence permits (since 1971), applications for regularization of formerly
unofficial immigrants during the amnesty programs (1986, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002), and the number of deportations of
undocumented immigrants over the period 1984–2006.
SOURCE: Ministry of Interior.

Combining these pieces of information, the relative crime rate of legal and illegal
immigrants is
E ( C L = 1)

E (C L = 0)

≈ 12.5%

,

(1)

where C = 1 for individuals reported by the police for having committed a crime and C = 0
otherwise, and where L = 1 and L = 0 denote the groups of legal and illegal immigrants. This

5

Fasani (2009) and Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti (2012) use applications for amnesty to estimate the size
of the illegal population in Italy. Winegarden and Khor (1991) do the same for the United States after the IRCA.
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means that compared to legal immigrants, illegals are about eight times more likely to commit a
crime. 6 Next, we examine what might explain such a stark difference in the likelihood of arrest.
Deportations and Selection into Legal Status
Much the same as in many Western countries, including the United States, residing
illegally in Italy as an undocumented person is a civil offense, not a criminal offense (Waters and
Simes 2013). 7 Illegal immigrants should be transferred to a detention center for unauthorized
aliens and, unless they qualify as asylum seekers, they should be deported back to their country
of origin. However, in many cases the procedure is not enforced—because of the overcrowding
of the detention centers and the cost of deportations—in which case the apprehended immigrant
simply receives an injunction to leave the country and is immediately released. Still, the fraction
of immigrants who are deported is not negligible. Figure 4 shows that, for the years in which
there was an amnesty, the ratio of expulsions over the total number of illegal immigrants (as
measured by the number of applications for amnesty) climbed from 17 percent in 1986 to 28
percent in 1998, eventually declining to 15 percent at the time of the last amnesty in 2002.
Deportations reduce the number of crimes committed in Italy by expelling from the
country a portion of the illegal immigrants, and some potential criminals among them. In
particular, the ratio in Equation (1) can be decomposed as

6

To compute Equation (1), notice that
E ( C L = 1)
c
r
= L / L ,
E ( C L = 0 ) 1 − cL 1 − rL

where CL and rL are the shares of legals among immigrants reported by the police and among all foreign residents,
respectively, and let CL ≈ 20 percent and rL ≈ 67 percent.
7
In other words, illegal immigrants apprehended in Italy cannot be sentenced to jail merely for being
illegally present in the territory. The last reform of Italian migration policy (Law N. 198/2002) introduced the
possibility of incarceration for illegal immigrants that were reapprehended by the police after ignoring a previous
injunction to leave the country. However, such a norm was never enforced and was later deemed anticonstitutional
(sentence 223/2004 of the Constitutional Court, discussed in Ghersi [2005]). Interestingly, in June 2012 the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected similar provisions contained in Arizona’s immigration law.
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E ( C L 1=
E ( C L 1)
=
)
1
=
×
0) 1 − E ( D L =
0) E (C L =
0, D =
0)
E (C L =

,

(2)

where D = 1 for the illegal immigrants who are deported and D = 0 otherwise, so E(D|L = 0) is
the probability of deportation and E(C|L = 0, D = 0) is the probability of committing a crime
conditional upon not being deported. The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (2)
reflects the incapacitation of illegal immigrants through deportations, as those who are deported
cannot commit crimes in Italy.
Turning to the second term in Equation (2), it captures both 1) the causal effect of legal
status on the individual propensity to engage in crime and 2) selection bias. Framing the problem
in the context of the potential outcome model (Rubin 1974), it may be rewritten as

=
E ( C 1 L 1)=
E ( C 1 L 1=
E ( C 0 L 1)
)
=
×
E ( C 0=
L 0,=
D 0 ) E ( C 0=
L 1) E ( C 0=
L 1,=
D 0)


 

causal effect

selection

,

(3)

where C 1 and C0 are the potential outcomes conditional upon having or not having legal
status, respectively. Selection bias is the main threat to identifying the causal effect, E(C 1 |L = 1) /
E(C0|L = 1), because we observe C0 only when L = 0, and, in general, legal and illegal
immigrants have different individual characteristics. For instance, more educated individuals
have better chances of finding employers willing to sponsor their work permits.
Such differences are indeed apparent from survey data collected in the northwest of Italy
just before the EU enlargement. Since 2001, the Italian nongovernmental organization Iniziative
e Studi sulla Multietnicità (ISMU) has conducted yearly interviews with a sample of about 9,000
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immigrants in the region of Lombardy. Exploiting immigrants’ networks around a number of
“aggregation centers” (shops, telephone centers, bars, etc.), the sampling design allows for
inclusion in the survey of the illegal component of the immigrant population (see Blangiardo
[2008]). The results of the survey confirm that illegal immigrants are, on average, less educated
than the legal ones; they also have lower earnings and lower skill-premiums (see Table 1). 8
There is also extensive evidence of the wage gap suffered by illegal immigrants in the United
States (see, among others, Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir [2002]; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark
[2002]; Kaushal [2006]; Lozano and Sorensen [2011]; Barcellos [2011]).
Table 1 Legal and Illegal Immigrants: Individual Characteristics and Labor Market Outcomes
Variable
Illegals
Legals
obs
mean
obs
mean
Age
1280
31.29
7343
34.63
(8.94)
(9.36)
Female
1281
0.39
7353
0.44
(0.49)
(0.50)
Married
1281
0.34
7353
0.59
(0.47)
(0.49)
Number of kids
1279
0.76
7339
1.18
(1.19)
(1.28)
College
1281
0.14
7353
0.16
(0.34)
(0.37)
Low-skilled
1281
0.12
7353
0.09
(0.33)
(0.28)
Income (euros per month)
949
824
5339
1130
(371)
(652)
College premium
949
9
5339
112
(35)
(25)

Diff.
−3.34***
(0.28)
−0.05***
(0.01)
−0.26***
(0.01)
−0.41***
(0.04)
−0.02***
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.01)
−306***
(22)
−103*
(62)

NOTE: This table reports the average characteristics of legal and illegal immigrants, as well as the between-group difference in
each variable. The source is the 2006 round of the ISMU survey, and the sample is representative of the entire immigrant
population of the Italian region of Lombardy. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
between-group differences that are statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence, 95 percent confidence, and 99 percent
confidence levels.

The observed differences in earnings may reflect both the direct effect of legal status, as
illegals cannot work in the official economy, and selection into legal status, as witnessed by the
significant differences in other (predetermined) individual characteristics. In particular, illegal

8

Drawing upon several rounds of the ISMU survey, Accetturo and Infante (2010) confirm these findings in
a multivariate regression analysis.
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immigrants are typically young, single males, and they are less educated and have fewer children
than legal immigrants. All these characteristics are associated in general with a higher propensity
to engage in crime, so the selection effect in Equation (2) may potentially explain a large part of
the difference in criminal activity between legal and illegal immigrants. Our quasi-experimental
design allows us to keep the composition of the two groups constant, in order to identify the
causal effect of legal status.

THE NATURAL EXPERIMENT
The EU Enlargement
In the wake of the EU enlargement, citizens of central and eastern European countries
became a large and growing share of total immigration to Italy, reaching about half of the foreign
(official) residents in 2011. The first round of the enlargement took place in 2004 with the
admission of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland,
Slovenia, and Slovakia. Then, on January 1, 2007, Bulgaria and Romania also joined the EU.
New EU member countries
Romanians and Bulgarians had already been given waivers to receive tourist visas to
enter the EU with Council Regulation N. 539/2001, and the absence of migration barriers inside
the single market area (after the Schengen Agreement of 1985) allowed them to move freely
within the EU already before 2007. However, the waiver was limited to a maximum of 90 days
in each EU member country, after which they had to move to another country, and they had no
right to work there.
Compared to this former arrangement, Article 39 of the European Commission Treaty
allows citizens of new member countries five advantages: It allows them to 1) look for a job in
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any other country within the EU, 2) work there without needing any permit, 3) live there for that
purpose, 4) stay until the end of the employment relationship, and 5) enjoy equal treatment with
natives in access to employment, working conditions, and all other social and tax advantages that
may help integration inside the host country.
In practice, however, several countries in Europe maintained significant restrictions. In
Italy as well, the application of the EU directives was at the center of a heated debate. On
December 28, 2006—just three days before the enlargement—the center-left government finally
guaranteed full rights to the new EU citizens, lifting all restrictions on working in the following
sectors: agriculture, hotel and tourism, managerial and highly skilled work, domestic work, care
services, construction, engineering, and seasonal work. Such sectors, indeed, account for the bulk
of immigrants’ employment in Italy. In the rest of the official economy (basically the
manufacturing sector) migration quotas were also eased in order to accommodate a larger
number of workers from Romania and Bulgaria.
Therefore, admission to the EU basically removed the migration barriers faced by
Romanians and Bulgarians in Italy, granting them full rights to reside and work (as opposed to a
temporary residence permit, as was in place before 2007). For the purpose of estimating the
effect of legal status, they will thus constitute the treated group.
EU candidate member countries
The process of enlargement is far from over, as several countries are negotiating
admission conditions with the EU; the EU candidate member countries are Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. 9
Such countries provide a natural control group for Romania and Bulgaria. They have
already started negotiations with the EU to gain admittance, so they should be most comparable
9

More details about the EU enlargement can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ .
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along the economic and political criteria required for admission. With the exception of Iceland,
they all belong to the same geographical area (see Figure 5); with the further exception of
Turkey, they also share a great deal of linguistic, cultural, and historical heritage. In practice, our
sample of
Figure 5 New EU Member and Candidate Member Countries

NOTE: The map shows the countries admitted to the EU during the last round of the enlargement (in black), as well as the group
of candidate member countries (in gray).
SOURCE: European Commission.

prison inmates pardoned in Italy will include just a few individuals from Turkey (less than 1
percent of the total sample) and no one from Iceland.
The effects of the EU enlargement in Italy: Preliminary evidence
The left graph in Figure 6 shows the number of official residents for the treated and the
control groups, before and after the enlargement. The difference remained constant until the end
of 2006, the control group being about twice as large as the treated group. Then, in the wake of
admission to the EU, the size of the treated group nearly doubled, while the control group
continued to grow at approximately the same rate as in previous years.
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Figure 6 Immigrants from New EU Member and Candidate Member Countries Residing in Italy, and
Number of Arrests

NOTE: The left graph plots the number of citizens of new EU member and candidate member countries officially residing in
Italy during the period 2002–2008. The right graph shows, instead, the ratio of those reported by the police over the number of
official residents arrested in each quarter during the period 2006–2007. In both graphs, the vertical line refers to the date of the
last EU enlargement.
SOURCE: ISTAT and Ministry of Interior.

The increase in the number of Romanians and Bulgarians arrested by the Italian police
was much less pronounced, so the ratio of those arrested over total official residents actually
declined for the treated group, while no significant change was observed for the control group
(see the right graph of Figure 6). At first blush, one might be tempted to conclude that the
removal of migration restrictions favored a decline in criminal activity. However, the increase in
the number of Romanians and Bulgarians officially residing in the country includes both new
immigrants and previous immigrants who acquired legal status only with the enlargement (but
were also present before), the two groups being indistinguishable from each other. If the fraction
of previously unofficial immigrants is nonnegligible, the statistics on official residents would
underestimate the denominator of the crime rate before the enlargement, so its decline after the
enlargement would just be a statistical artifact of measurement error in the previous period. If the
increase of official residents is instead driven by new inflows, the change in the crime rate would
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depend not only on the causal effect of legal status on previously unofficial immigrants, but also
on the different selection of new immigrants after the enlargement.
One way to address these issues is to focus on a sample of immigrants who were already
present in Italy before the enlargement.
The July 2006 Collective Pardon
Upon a collective pardon that was passed in July 2006, several hundred Romanian,
Bulgarian, and other eastern European immigrants were released from prisons all over Italy.
Collective clemency bills are deeply rooted in Italian history—over the last 40 years there has
been on average one every five years (Barbarino and Mastrobuoni 2014). Such pardons eliminate
part of the inmates’ sentences, typically two or three years, and inmates whose residual sentence
is below such a length are immediately released. Given their wide reach, and a skewed
distribution of residual jail time, pardons generate sudden releases of large numbers of inmates.
The only offenders who do not receive pardons are mafia members, terrorists, kidnappers, and
sexual offenders, but even violent offenders, like murderers and robbers, are released.
The last pardon was voted on by the Italian Parliament in July 2006 and enacted shortly
thereafter (on August 1). We were granted access to the criminal records of all prison inmates
released on this occasion, including the exact dates of release and reincarceration (if any) up until
December 2007, their nationality, and a few other individual characteristics.
About 22,000 individuals, corresponding to more than one-third of the total prison
population, were freed over a few days. More than 8,000 of them were foreigners, and with
subsequent releases their number grew to total 9,642 by the end of 2006. Since a necessary
condition for obtaining a residence permit in Italy is having a clean criminal record and a job,
these individuals were illegal at the time of the pardon and should have been immediately
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deported upon release. However, because of the massive size of the release, only a handful of
released inmates (seven in total, believed to be Islamic fundamentalists from Algeria and
Morocco) were expelled from the country (Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs 2007). This
explains why so many released inmates were able to recidivate and were back in jail within a few
days or weeks. About 800 were back by the end of 2006, before the EU enlargement, and their
number grew to 1,654 one year later, after the EU enlargement (Figure 2). Our empirical strategy
consists of comparing the recidivism of pardoned inmates in the treated and control groups,
before and after the EU enlargement.
When interpreting the results, we take advantage of two other important aspects of our
quasi-experimental design. First, immigrants with a criminal record cannot apply for a residence
permit, so the only ones among pardoned inmates who acquired legal status because of the
European enlargement between 2006 and 2007 were those in the treated group. 10 While
immigration amnesties would hardly be granted to ex-convicts, the EU legislation grants legal
status universally. 11
Second, prison inmates pardoned with the Clemency Bill would be sent to jail
immediately upon recidivating, regardless of their legal status. This prevents the emergence of
the following bias. While immigrants are not incarcerated only for being illegally present in
Italian territory (see the section “Deportations and Selection into Legal Status”), they may still
experience a higher probability of incarceration conditional upon having committed a crime.
According to law, suspect offenders can be incarcerated before trial if caught “red-handed”
(flagranza di reato), or whenever there is a significant risk that they will either destroy the
evidence, recommit the same crime, or escape judgment (upon decision of a special court,
10

In any case, noncompliance with treatment—i.e., the presence of some individuals in the control group
obtaining legal status—would bias our estimates toward zero.
11
It is considerably more cumbersome to expel EU nonnationals.
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Giudice per le indagini preliminari). Since illegal immigrants are usually deemed at greater risk
of bad conduct they may, in general, be more likely to be incarcerated than legal immigrants.
This is not true, however, in our sample of pardoned prison inmates, as previous
offenders are always deemed at high risk and incarcerated immediately upon arrest (regardless of
legal status). Moreover, the pardoned individual rearrested within five years of the release must
go back to jail to serve the residual sentence that was pardoned, with no possibility of benefiting
from alternative forms of detention (e.g. home detention). This means that the police forces
would have the same incentives to target pardoned Romanians and Bulgarians as they would
pardoned criminals from EU candidate countries. There is no obvious reason why it should be
easier to arrest and build a case against members of one group over the other, and why, assuming
there is such a difference, the difference would have to change with legal status. Finally, no bail
is allowed in the Italian judicial system.
These features of the Clemency Bill—and, more generally, of the Italian judicial
system—thus allow an interpretation of the relative changes in incarceration rates between the
treated and control groups as changes in the underlying criminal activity.
Sample
Our sample includes about 800 Romanians and Bulgarians, as well as 1,800 immigrants
from candidate member countries (none from Iceland). To reduce heterogeneity we restrict the
analysis to males—about 90 percent of the total sample—so we are left with 725 and 1,622
individuals in the treated and control groups, respectively. The row headings down the left
margin of Table 2 categorize the two groups in terms of the observable characteristics reported in
our data: age, gender, marital status, education (missing for many observations), the type of
crime for which the individual was first incarcerated before the pardon (possibly more than one,
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so the group means of economic and violent crimes do not add up to one), the length of the
original sentence, and the months commuted under the pardon. 12
Table 2 Sample Statistics by Group, Raw and Propensity Score–Weighted Data
Nonweighted sample
Propensity score–weighted
New EU
Control
Diff
New EU
Control
obs
mean
obs
mean
obs
mean
obs
mean
Age
725
31.083 1622 33.269
−2.187*** 700
33.335 1493 32.716
(7.597)
(8.088)
(8.528)
(7.914)
Low education
725
0.339 1622
0.461
−0.122*** 700
0.437 1495
0.422
(0.474)
(0.499) (0.022)
(0.496)
(0.494)
No education
725
0.017 1622
0.017
−0.0001
700
0.015 1493
0.018
(0.128)
(0.128) (0.006)
(0.122)
(0.133)
Education missing 725
0.539 1622
0.404
0.135*** 700
0.437 1493
0.450
(0.499)
(0.491) (0.022)
(0.496)
(0.498)
Married
725
0.257 1622
0.288
−0.031
700
0.266 1493
0.277
(0.437)
(0.453) (0.02)
(0.442)
(0.448)
Economic crimes
725
0.84
1622
0.894
−0.054*** 700
0.857 1493
0.877
(0.367)
(0.308) (0.015)
(0.35)
(0.328)
Violent crimes
725
0.295 1622
0.242
0.053*** 700
0.284 1493
0.262
(0.456)
(0.428) (0.02)
(0.451)
(0.44)
Sentence (months) 725
20.31
1622 39.183 −18.873*** 700
32.115 1493 33.269
(20.706)
(32.33)
(1.306)
(30.63)
(30.593)
Residual sentence 725
9.305 1622 15.727
−6.423*** 700
13.349 1493 13.83
(10.615)
(14.784) (0.609)
(12.917)
(14.13)

Diff
0.619
(0.38)
0.015
(0.023)
−0.003
(0.006)
−0.013
(0.024)
−0.011
(0.021)
−0.02
(0.016)
0.022
(0.021)
−1.154
(1.435)
−0.481
(0.646)

NOTE: This table compares the characteristics of Romanians and Bulgarians in our sample with the group of citizens from EU
candidate member countries. The first three columns report nonweighted averages for each group, as well as the between-group
difference for each variable. In the last three columns, observations are weighted by the inverse propensity score, according to
Equation (4). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote between-group differences that are
statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence, 95 percent confidence, and 99 percent confidence levels.

While marital status is not significantly different, Romanians and Bulgarians are on
average younger and more educated than individuals in the control group; they are also more
(less) likely to commit violent (economic) crimes, but receive on average lighter sentences. One
reason may be that the migration waves from some countries in the control group (notably
Albania and the former Yugoslavia) predate those from Romania and Bulgaria, which makes for
longer criminal careers in Italy, a higher incidence of repeat offenders, and longer sentences as a
consequence. To the extent that such differences are correlated with criminal activity, the
“parallel paths” assumption behind our difference-in-differences approach may be violated.
12

The data also report the prison from which the individual was released (167 institutes in total), which we
use later in the analysis.
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However, if we are willing to assume that deviations from the “parallel paths” depend
solely upon differences in observable characteristics, conditioning on such differences removes
all biases. While conditional independence may be a stringent requirement, notice that we are
imposing it on changes in the crime rate over time (as opposed to levels); that is, we allow for
(time-invariant) differences between groups to persist even after conditioning on observable
characteristics. Most importantly, the availability of longitudinal data for the pretreatment period
provides us with the opportunity to investigate the plausibility of this assumption.
Following Abadie (2005), we thus weight observations by the (inverse) propensity score
of assignment—i.e., the probability of belonging to each group, conditional upon the observed
covariates. Specifically, the weight attached to each i-th observation is
new EU i

p
1− p
+ (1 − new EU i )
P ( Xi )
1− P ( Xi )

,

(4)

where new EUi is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a citizen of new EU member countries
and 0 otherwise, p is the unconditional probability of belonging to the new EU group, and P(Xi)
is the probability conditional on the vector of individual characteristics Xi. The weighting scheme
enhances comparability between the two groups by attaching more weight to units that are more
similar to the other group relative to the average individual in the sample. 13
To estimate the propensity score we estimate a logit regression for the probability of
being Romanian or Bulgarian, conditional upon the following vector of covariates: a quadratic
polynomial in age, marital status, education (indicator variables for illiteracy, primary school,
and secondary school, as well as for missing information on education), type of crime committed
when first incarcerated (seven categories), a quadratic polynomial in sentence and commuted

13

One important advantage of propensity score weighting, relative to other matching estimators, is the
possibility of computing asymptotically valid standard errors by bootstrapping methods (Abadie and Imbens 2008).
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sentence, and a full set of fixed effects for the region where the prison from which the individual
was released is located. 14 As expected, there is a tail of individuals in the control group whose
estimated propensity score is close to zero, meaning they are very different (in terms of
observable characteristics) from Romanians and Bulgarians (see Figure 7). The inverse
propensity score-weighting reduces the importance of such observations, while it increases the
weight of observations in both groups that lie in the middle of the distribution of the estimated
propensity score.
The right columns of Table 2 show that weighting observations according to Equation (4)
indeed eliminates all differences in average group characteristics. Whether it also eliminates
differences in unobservable characteristics is basically untestable, yet differences in
preenlargement outcomes between the treated and control groups, which we examine next, allow
us to assess the credibility of the conditional independence assumption.
Figure 7 Propensity Score Weighting

NOTE: The figure shows the kernel density of the estimated propensity score across groups. The propensity score is the
probability of belonging to the groups of citizens of new EU member countries, conditional upon observable characteristics. The
estimate is based on a logit regression of a dummy for being Romanian and Bulgarian on a flexible specification of the individual
information included in our sample.

14

We dropped a few observations for which some covariates other than schooling were missing.
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RESULTS
This section presents our estimates of the effect of changes in legal status on the number
of crimes committed by immigrants. We start by nonparametrically comparing differences in the
hazard rate of reincarceration (i.e., the probability of being reincarcerated in a given period
conditional upon not having been reincarcerated before) between the treated and control groups,
before and after the enlargement; then we estimate semiparametric and fully parametric
maximum likelihood hazard rate models. We conclude with a series of robustness exercises and
falsification tests.
Preliminary Evidence
Figure 8 shows nonparametric estimates of the daily (log) hazard rates of reincarceration
for pardoned individuals from new EU member and candidate member countries. For the sake of
graphical illustration, we focus on inmates released during the first week after the pardon (1,392
individuals out of 2,347 in our sample), so the horizontal axis represents (approximately) the
same duration-at-risk for all individuals. 15 Since we are particularly interested in the effect of
legal status through legitimate earning opportunities, we focus on individuals who were first
arrested (before the pardon) for economically motivated crimes (mainly property and drugrelated offenses). 16
The left panel shows the results obtained using the raw data—i.e., before applying the
weighting scheme. While Romanians and Bulgarians display greater recidivism during the first
months after the pardon, the opposite is true after they obtain legal status. As to the plausibility
of the main identifying assumption, the evidence from the preenlargement period seems broadly

15
16

All estimates presented next are based on the total sample.
The data do not contain information on the crimes committed after the pardon.
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Figure 8 Hazard Rates of Rearrest for Pardoned Inmates from New EU Member and Candidate Member
Countries

NOTE: The figure plots the nonparametric (Nelson-Aalen) estimates of daily log hazard rates of reincarceration between
between August 2006 and May 2007 for Romanians and Bulgarians (solid line) and for the control group (dashed line). The
scale on the vertical axis reports the (estimated) hazard rate of reincarceration in each day The left graph does not use weights,
while in the right graph observations are weighted by the (estimated) propensity score according to Equation (4).

consistent with the hypothesis of parallel outcomes (absent the policy change). After weighting
observations by the inverse propensity score (right panel), the level of the hazard rate is also very
similar between the two groups, which provides strong support for conditional independence.
To quantify the effect of legal status, in Table 3 we tabulate the hazard rate of rearrest for
each group over the last two trimesters of 2006 and the first two of 2007, their differences, and
the difference-in-differences; we report both robust and bootstrapped standard errors clustered by
nationality and region. 17 This allows for criminal activity to be correlated across inmates of the
same nationality who (likely) reside in the same region. While bootstrapping generally leads to
valid standard errors and confidence intervals for propensity score–weighting estimators (Abadie
and Imbens 2008), Busso, DiNardo, and McCrary (2009) show that, for a sufficiently large
number of observations, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors provide a good approximation.
The two estimates of the standard errors in Table 3 are actually extremely similar; thus, for the
sake of computational efficiency, inference on the maximum likelihood models will be based on
robust (clustered) standard errors.
17

Italy is divided into 20 regions, and there are eight different nationalities in our sample. Since not all
nationalities are represented in all regions, the number of clusters is equal to 129.
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Table 3 Probability of Reincarceration for Pardoned Inmates from New EU Member and Candidate
Member Countries, Before and After the EU Enlargement
Economic crimes
Noneconomic crimes
New EU
Control
Diff.
New EU
Control
Diff.
0.023
0.054
−0.031**
0.047
0.034
0.013
Post
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.010)
(0.020)
(0.014)
(0.025)
[0.006]
[0.008]
[0.010]
[0.021]
[0.014]
[0.025]
0.058
0.057
0.001
0.033
0.043
−0.009
Pre
(0.013)
(0.007)
(0.015)
(0.028)
(0.021)
(0.035)
[0.014]
[0.008]
[0.015]
[0.019]
[0.022]
[0.029]
−0.035**
−0.003
−0.032*
0.014
−0.009
0.023
Diff.
(0.014)
(0.011)
(0.017)
(0.034)
(0.025)
([0.043])
[0.014]
[0.011]
[0.018]
[0.028]
[0.027]
[0.039]
Economic crimes, north
Economic crimes, south
0.014
0.061
−0.046**
0.034
0.046
−0.013
Post
(0.006)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.012)
(0.015)
[0.007]
[0.011]
[0.013]
[0.010]
[0.012]
[0.015]
0.066
0.053**
0.013
0.049
0.063
−0.014
Pre
(0.020)
(0.009)
(0.022)
(0.017)
(0.012)
(0.021)
[0.020]
[0.010]
[0.022]
[0.019]
[0.013]
[0.023]
−0.052**
0.007
−0.059
−0.015
−0.017
0.001
Diff.
(0.021)
(0.014)
(0.025)
(0.020)
(0.017)
(0.026)
[0.021]
[0.015]
[0.025]
[0.021]
[0.018]
[0.027]
NOTE: This table reports the fraction of citizens of new EU member and candidate member countries that are reincarcerated
before (“pre”) and after (“post”) the enlargement, as well as the difference and difference-in-differences between the two groups
for different subsamples of pardoned inmates. The top left and right panels show the cross-tabulation for the subsamples of
individuals that were previously incarcerated (before the pardon) for economic and violent crimes, while the bottom left and right
panels distinguish between economic offenders in northern and southern Italy. Observations are weighted by the inverse
propensity score according to Equation (4). Robust standard errors clustered by Italian region and country of origin are reported
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote between-group differences that are statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence, 95
percent confidence, and 99 percent confidence levels. Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 400 replications, are also reported
in square brackets.

The top left panel of the table shows the results for economically motivated offenders.
The second row confirms that, after weighting by the propensity score, the probability of
incarceration in the pretreatment period is identical between the two groups. The hazard rate of
Romanians and Bulgarians decreases from 5.8 percent to 2.3 percent after the policy change,
while it is unaffected for the control group; as a result, the difference-in-differences is negative
(−3.2 percent) and statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. These numbers
imply that the hazard ratio of committing a crime between legal and illegal immigrants is close to
43 percent (0.023 / 0.054). In light of the simple framework in Section 2, the reduction in the
propensity to commit crimes for immigrants in the treated group (the second term on the right-
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hand side of Equation [2]) outweighs the fact that the potential criminals among them are not
expelled any longer (the first term on the right-hand side of the equation).
The opposite is true for violent offenders (top right panel), though the result is not
statistically significant. 18 For such offenders, criminal activity should depend to a lesser extent
on economic motives (Machin and Meghir 2004), so changes in labor market opportunities play
only a minor role, and the effect of the negative change in deportations prevails.
Heterogeneity in the effect across criminal types is consistent with the fact that legal
status may affect criminal behavior by changing the labor market opportunities of the legalized
immigrants. While we cannot provide hard evidence in this respect, as we do not observe the
labor market outcomes of immigrants in our sample, additional heterogeneity in the effect across
Italian regions is also consistent with such a mechanism. It is a well-known fact that northern
Italy is economically much more developed than the south, with GDP-per-capita differences that
are close to 50 percent. 19 One aspect of this economic divide is that the relative size of the
unofficial economy is twice as large in the south as in the north, so the change in labor market
opportunities associated with the acquisition of legal status should be greater in the latter than in
the former. If legal status reduces crime because it improves economic prospects in the official
sector, one would then expect the reduction to be concentrated in the north. This is exactly the
picture that emerges from Table 3 (bottom panels). The change in the fraction of Romanians and
Bulgarians reincarcerated for economic crimes in the north between 2006 and 2007, as well as

18

To be as conservative as possible, we include in this category individuals who were previously in prison
for having committed only violent crimes; those reported for both economic and violent crimes are included among
economically motivated offenders, as the latter crimes could be tied to the former ones (e.g., an assault during a
robbery).
19
The economic divide between northern and southern Italy has long been studied (see, for instance,
Eckaus [1961]; Helliwell and Putnam [1995]). Estimates of GDP differences are provided by the Italian Statistical
Office, http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/52316.
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the difference-in-differences relative to the control group, is almost twice as large as the change
based on the whole country, while no significant differences show up in the south.
Cox Model
To probe these results further, and to exploit all the information about the dates of release
and rearrest, we fit a maximum-likelihood model for the hazard rate of reincarceration.
Following most empirical applications of survival analysis (see Van den Berg [2001] for a
survey), we restrict ourselves to the class of proportional hazard models, in which the hazard rate
is the product of a common function of time-at-risk and an exponential function of observable
covariates.
Specifically, the estimating equation is
h=
( J t , x ) λ ( t ) exp (α 0 post + α1new EU + β post × new EU + z ′γ ) ,

(5)

where h(J |t, x) is the hazard rate of reincarceration after t days since release from prison,
conditional on a vector x, including a dummy post for the (calendar) period after the
enlargement, a dummy new EU for individuals in the treated group, the interaction between the
two, and a vector of other observable characteristics z; finally, λ(t) is a common function of the
time-at-risk. Following the semiparametric approach devised by Cox (1972), we leave the
baseline hazard function λ(t) totally unrestricted and estimate the other coefficients by partial
maximum likelihood. This way we take advantage of the tractability of the proportional hazard
model, while allowing at the same time for significant flexibility in terms of functional form.
Standard errors are clustered by Italian region and country of origin to allow for within-network
correlation in criminal activity. 20

20

In Section 4.3.1 we show that the results change little when we generalize the proportional hazard model
to allow for unobserved heterogeneity and when we go for a fully parametric approach.
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The estimated coefficient β captures the difference-in-differences between the hazard rate
of reincarceration for the treated and control groups, before and after the EU enlargement,
controlling for group-specific effects, calendar time periods, time-at-risk, and other individual
characteristics. The exponentiated coefficient of the interaction term, exp(β), provides an
estimate for the hazard ratio of legal status—i.e., the (constant) percentage effect of legal status
on the probability of reincarceration. Such probability equals the probability of going to jail,
conditional upon having committed a crime, times the hazard ratio of committing a crime,
=
h ( J L 1)

h ( J L 0)
=

=

Pr ob=
( J C , L 1=
) h ( C L 1)

Pr ob=
( J C , L 0=
) h (C L 0)

.

(6)

As long as the probability of incarceration conditional upon having committed a crime is
constant across the individuals in our sample (see the discussion in the section “The July 2006
Collective Pardon”), the first term on the right-hand side equals 1, so the exponentiated
coefficient (Equation [6]) provides an estimate of the causal effect of legal status on the
probability of committing a crime in Equation (3).
The results are presented in Table 4. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative,
statistically significant (at the 95 percent confidence level), and very high in absolute value. The
exponentiated coefficient suggests that the hazard ratio of legal status is about 57 percent. These
findings are unaffected when we control for the individual characteristics reported in our data
(column 2), which is consistent with the fact that the propensity score weighting guarantees the
comparability of the two groups in terms of observable characteristics. (Notice also that the
estimate for the group indicator is always very close to 0).
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Table 4 Cox Model for the Hazard Rate of Reincarceration
(1)
(2)
(3)
Baseline
Econ
new EU
−0.016
−0.027
0.002
(0.219)
(0.216)
(0.208)
post
−0.149
−0.171
−0.277
(0.336)
(0.338
(0.392)
new EU × post
−0.563*** −0.557** −0.668**
(0.215)
(0.217)
(0.286)
56.9%
57.3%
51.2%
h ( C L = 1)
exp ( β ) ≈
E (C L = 0)
Observations
Controls
χ2

4,177
no
10.55

4,177
yes
30.23

3,653
yes
32.78

(4)
Nonecon
−0.215
(0.987)
0.493
(0.863)
0.243
(1.129)
127.5%

524
yes
3.67

(5)
North
0.234
(0.245)
−0.343
(0.560)
−0.923**
(0.427)
39.7%

(6)
South
−0.256
(0.307)
−0.154
(0.566)
−0.331
(0.310)
71.8%

2,013
yes
29.34

1,640
yes
11.60

NOTE: The table shows the semiparametric estimates of the Cox model (5) for the hazard rate of reincarceration. The main
explanatory variables are a dummy for citizens of new EU member countries, new EU; a dummy for the period after the EU
enlargement, post; and the interaction between the two. The exponentiated coefficient of the interaction term provides an estimate
for the hazard ratio of legal status (see Equation [6]). The specifications in columns (2) to (6) include as additional regressors age,
age squared, a dummy for being married, and the length of the sentence commuted with the pardon. Regressions are weighted by
the inverse propensity score according to Equation (4). Robust standard errors clustered by Italian region and country of origin
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence, 95%
confidence, and 99% confidence levels.

Columns (3) and (4) distinguish between different types of offenders. In line with the
means comparisons in Table 3, the overall effect is driven by a reduction in the criminal activity
of individuals who were previously incarcerated for economic crimes, while the hazard rate of
reincarceration increases slightly for violent offenders (although this latter effect is very
imprecisely estimated). Finally, columns (5) and (6) confirm that the reduction in the hazard rate
for economically motivated offenders is much stronger in northern regions.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 uncover a strong negative effect of legal status on the
hazard rate of committing a crime in Italy. According to such results, the hazard ratio of legal
status is slightly above 50 percent for economic crimes, and is less than 40 percent in northern
regions. This is a sizable effect. In the section titled “Crime Rates,” we showed that, based on the
available estimates of the unofficial foreign population in Italy, the incarceration rate for legal
immigrants is about 12.5 percent that of illegal immigrants (see Equation [1]). The causal effect
of legal status would then account for one-half to two-thirds of such a difference. The remaining
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part would likely be explained by (positive) selection into legal status, as well as by differences
in the probability of incarceration conditional upon having committed a crime. The latter is
constant across our sample of former prison inmates, but could vary in general between legal and
illegal immigrants in Italy (see the discussion at the end of the section “The July 2006 Collective
Pardon”).
As for violent offenders, the maximum likelihood estimates are also qualitatively similar
to the results in Table 3: the hazard rate of reincarceration increases, although the effect is small
and not statistically significant. Interestingly, if we plug a deportation rate of about 15 percent
(see the section “Deportations and Selection into Legal Status”) into Equation (2) and we
compute the hazard ratio conditional on not being deported (i.e., the second term on the righthand side of the equation), such a number would be very close to unity, 1.27 ∗ (1 − 0.15) ≈ 1.07.
This is indeed consistent with the idea that legal status should have little or no effect on the
behavior of violent criminals, and the only reason why the crime rate increases for this group is
that they are not deported any longer after the acquisition of legal status.
Robustness
Next we subject our results to several robustness exercises and falsification tests.
Functional form and unobserved heterogeneity
One issue concerns the functional form and the estimation method. The flexibility
allowed for by semiparametric estimation of the Cox model comes at a cost in terms of statistical
power. For this reason, we estimate a fully parametric model that imposes a logistic form on the
probability of reincarceration. To condition the probability of rearrest on not having been
rearrested before, we follow Efron (1988) and estimate the model on the weekly (unbalanced)
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panel of inmates who are at risk of incarceration during each period. 21 The results, presented in
Table 5, are in line with those obtained for the semiparametric model, both in terms of statistical
significance and magnitude. 22
Table 5 Logit Model for the Probability of Reincarceration
(1)
(2)
(3)
Baseline
Econ
new EU
0.044
0.032
0.070
(0.229)
(0.228)
(0.223)
post
−0.201
−0.135
−0.155
(0.237)
(0.296)
(0.354)
new EU × post
−0.623***
−0.598***
−0.711**
(0.219)
(0.215)
(0.284)
Observations
142,124
142,124
124,019
Time at risk (quad.)
yes
yes
yes
Calendar time (quad.)
no
yes
yes
Controls
no
yes
yes
χ2
52.26
81.22
54.73

(4)
Nonecon
−0.215
(0.997)
0.032
(1.004)
0.237
(1.134)
18,105
yes
yes
yes
12.75

(5)
North
0.245
(0.248)
0.179
(0.424)
−0.880**
(0.406)
68,151
yes
yes
yes
73.55

(6)
South
−0.123
(0.351)
−0.611
(0.527)
−0.464
(0.346)
55,868
yes
yes
yes
47.07

NOTE: The table shows the parametric estimates of a Logit model for the probability of incarceration for immigrants from new
EU member and candidate member countries before and after the EU enlargement. The main explanatory variables are a dummy
for citizens of new EU member countries, new EU; a dummy for the period after the EU enlargement, post; and the interaction
between the two. The panel of observations is unbalanced because we include only the individuals who are at risk of rearrest in
any given week. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial for the duration of time at risk; columns (2) to (6) include, in
addition, a quadratic polynomial for calendar time and additional individual characteristics—namely age, age squared, a dummy
for being married, and the length of the sentence commuted with the pardon. Regressions are weighted by the inverse propensity
score according to Equation (4). Robust standard errors clustered by Italian region and country of origin are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence, 95% confidence, and
99% confidence levels.

Another concern is unobserved heterogeneity. A fairly general result in the econometrics
of survival analysis is that variation in omitted factors would bias the estimates of both the
baseline hazard and the regressors’ coefficients, no matter what the correlation between the
included and excluded variables may be (see the discussion in Van den Berg 2001). 23 Notice
that our difference-in-differences specification allows for the presence of common unobserved
21

In practice, the cross section of observations for the first week includes all individuals released
immediately after the pardon, the one for the second week includes all those released until then and not
reincarcerated in the first week, and so on; in this way we end up with approximately 142,000 person-week
observations. Lee and McCrary (2009) also adopt this strategy to estimate an empirical model of recidivism, while
Ashenfelter and Card (2002) apply the same methodology to study retirement choices.
22
As shown in Allison (1982) and Card and Levine (2000), the two models give similar results as long as
the hazard rates are low.
23
The intuition is easier to see for the baseline hazard: Whenever there is omitted heterogeneity in the
hazard rates, having individuals with the highest (lowest) hazards leaving the pool of those at risk earlier (later)
would be observationally equivalent to negative duration dependence. A similar argument applies to the derivative
of the (log) hazard rate with respect to the vector of covariates.
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heterogeneity in both the treated and control groups. The only serious threat to identification
would be the presence of a different degree of heterogeneity within the two groups (i.e., a
different distribution of u), but this seems unlikely given that such groups are similar in terms of
observable characteristics and preenlargement outcomes (see Figure 8 and Table 3).
In any event, we augment the proportional hazard model in Equation (6) with an
unobserved component u, distributed according to the density g(u). Mixed proportional hazard
models of this sort can be estimated parametrically assuming that g(.) is a Gamma distribution
and λ(t) is a parametric function of time-at-risk t. We estimated both a Weibull and an
exponential model, and we could not reject the latter (i.e., λ is simply a constant). Table 6
compares the estimates of the exponential model with and without unobserved heterogeneity. No
matter which specification and sample are chosen, without controlling for unobserved

Table 6 Exponential Hazard Model with and without Unobserved Heterogeneity
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Baseline
Econ Nonecon North
new EU
−0.014
−0.021
−0.026
−0.057
−0.023
−0.301
0.248
(0.220)
(0.254)
(0.217)
(0.253)
(0.239)
(0.871) (0.288)
post
0.986
0.980
0.974
0.945
0.977
0.740
1.282
−0.469*** −0.161
−0.468*** −0.090
−0.127
1.054
0.058
(0.136)
(0.236)
(0.136)
(0.312)
(0.394)
(1.590) (0.517)
new EU × post
0.625
0.851
0.626
0.914
0.881
2.870
1.060
−0.559*** −0.779*** −0.554** −0.803*** −0.916** 1.088 −1.321**
(0.216)
(0.292)
(0.218)
(0.331)
(0.458)
(2.393) (0.671)
0.572
0.459
0.575
0.448
0.400
2.969
0.267
h ( C L = 1)
exp ( β ) ≈
E (C L = 0)

(8)
South
−0.332
(0.371)
0.717
−0.039
(1.127)
0.962
−0.573
(0.637)
0.564

Heterogeneity
Controls
χ2
Observations

yes
yes
13.64
1,640

no
no
31.93
4,177

yes
no
11.56
4,177

no
yes
51.51
4,177

yes
yes
31.95
4,177

yes
yes
34.77
3,653

yes
yes
3.49
524

yes
yes
31.30
2,013

NOTE: The table shows the parametric estimates of an exponential hazard model for the probability of incarceration for
immigrants from new EU member and candidate member countries before and after the EU enlargement. The main explanatory
variables are a dummy for citizens of new EU member countries, new EU; a dummy for the period after the EU enlargement,
post; and the interaction between the two. The specifications with additional controls include also a quadratic polynomial for
calendar time and additional individual characteristics—namely age, age squared, a dummy for being married, and the length of
the sentence commuted with the pardon. The unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be distributed according to the gamma
distribution. Regressions are weighted by the inverse propensity score according to Equation (4). Robust standard errors clustered
by Italian region and country of origin are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote coefficients significantly different from
zero at the 90% confidence, 95% confidence, and 99% confidence levels.
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heterogeneity, the estimated coefficients of the exponential model are very similar to those of the
Cox model. More importantly, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity increases the magnitude of
the interaction coefficient, suggesting an even lower hazard ratio of legal status (about 40 percent
for economic offenders, down to 27 percent in northern regions).
Placebo regressions
Another concern is that the results might depend on the choice of the control group.
While candidate EU member countries represent a natural control group for new EU member
countries, we want to make sure that such choice does not drive the results. For this reason, we
randomly draw 1,000 samples of inmates from outside the new EU member or candidate
member countries and rerun the estimates as if each of these placebo samples is the true treated
group (we maintain the same group size, 724 individuals). Figure 9 shows that the densities of
the placebo effects are centered around zero, suggesting that the change in recidivism
experienced by the control group after the EU enlargement is not abnormal; what clearly is
abnormal is the estimated effect for the true treated group (vertical line), but only for
economically motivated offenders. The p-value reported in the last column of Table 7 equals the
Figure 9 The Density of Placebo Effects

NOTE: The figure plots the distribution of placebo effects obtained for 1,000 samples that have the same size as the treated group
(724 individuals) but are randomly drawn from the population of former inmates that belong neither to the treated nor to the
control group. The effects estimated for the true treated groups are shown with a vertical line.
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Table 7 Comparison Between the Actual Treated Group and the Placebo Samples
Placebo samples
New EU
mean
std. dev.
p5
p50
p95
coeff
p-value
Difference-in-difference
Economic crimes
0.010
0.024
−0.027
0.009
0.048
−0.032
0.026
Noneconomic crimes
−0.014
0.071
−0.130
−0.013
0.098
0.023
0.273
Cox model, interaction coefficient
Economic crimes
0.212
0.271
−0.225
0.205
0.687
−0.668
0.001
Noneconomic crimes
−0.166
2.883
−1.920
−0.405
1.458
0.243
0.249
NOTE: The table compares the estimates obtained for 1,000 placebo samples with those obtained for the treated group
(Romanians and Bulgarians). The placebo samples have the same size as the treated group (724 individuals) but are randomly
drawn from the population of former inmates that belong neither to the treated nor to the control group. The first two columns
show the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of the difference-in-differences (first two rows) and interaction
coefficients in the Cox model (last two rows) estimated for the placebo samples; the third to fifth columns report the 5th, 50th,
and 95th percentiles of the same distribution. Finally, the last two columns report the coefficients estimated for the actual treated
group and their p-values relative to the distribution of placebo estimates.

probability that the effect estimated for a randomly drawn placebo sample is negative and larger,
in absolute value, than the one estimated for the true treated group. Such probability is always
very low for the subsample of economically motivated offenders (0.1 percent when estimated
from the Cox model), while the p-value is 25 to 27 percent in the case of violent offenders.
Placebo dates of enlargement
We also run a series of falsification tests at different placebo dates (rather than across
placebo groups), in order to exclude the possibility that we are capturing the effect of some other
event besides the EU enlargement. In the spirit of structural break tests with unknown breakpoint
(Andrews 1993), Figure 10 plots the ratio of the R2 of the difference-in-differences model
estimated at each placebo date in our sample period over the R2 of a restricted specification
without the interaction term, distinguishing between different subsamples. The most likely break
point for Italy as a whole is December 12, which is very close to the official date of the
enlargement and is consistent with anticipation effects as uncertainty unravels during the last few
weeks of 2006 (see the subsection titled “The EU Enlargement”). The break points estimated
separately for northern and southern regions are very similar (December 1 and December 7),
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Figure 10 Structural Break Test

NOTE: The graph plots the ratio of the R2 of the difference-in-differences in reincarceration between treatment and control
groups before and after each possible (placebo) treatment date in our sample period over the R2 of a restricted specification
without the difference-in-differences term. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the day that maximizes the R2 ratio (i.e., the
most likely break point), while the vertical solid line is the official date of the EU enlargement.

although the additional explanatory power is much greater in the former case (as is consistent
with the evidence in Tables 3–5).
Attrition
In principle, the Romanians and Bulgarians in our sample could have moved to other EU
countries after obtaining legal status in the EU as a whole, in which case the reduction in the
hazard rate of reincarceration would be due to the fact that they spent less time in the pool at risk
(rather than due to changes in criminal behavior). Yet there are at least three reasons why
differential attrition between the treated and control groups cannot explain the results (or may
actually bias our estimates toward zero). First, the tourist visa waiver granted in 2001 to
Romanians and Bulgarians, and the absence of border enforcement within the EU area (see the
section “The EU Enlargement”), allowed for significant mobility already before 2007. Indeed,
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the 90-day term limit imposed on the visa waiver was computed separately for each destination
country in the EU, so between 2001 and 2007 Romanians and Bulgarians had the greatest
incentive to travel frequently across different countries within the EU in order to avoid illegality.
Therefore, the attrition rates for the treated group should have been higher before 2007, in which
case our estimates of the difference-in-difference effect would be biased toward zero. Second,
our findings point to a greater effect for economically motivated offenders in regions that offer
relatively better income opportunities to legal immigrants. There is no clear reason why outflows
toward other EU countries should have been greater for such categories of immigrants; if
anything, we should expect the opposite.
Interactions in crime
Finally, we address the concern that the (change in) criminal behavior of Romanians and
Bulgarians may have influenced the behavior of the control group, because of interactions in
crime between different communities of immigrants. If immigrants in the control group
increased their criminal activity in response to the decrease by Romanians and Bulgarians—i.e.,
if there are substitution effects—our estimates would be inflated; the opposite would occur in the
case of complementarities.
To address this issue we explicitly include interactions in crime into our empirical
specification, allowing the hazard rate of each individual to depend upon that of his peers, both
in his own and in the other group, and we follow Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009) and Drago
and Galbiati (2012) in exploiting quasi-random variation in commuted sentence to identify such
effects. In the section “The July 2006 Collective Pardon” we mentioned that, whenever released
inmates are rearrested within five years, the commuted residual sentence gets added to the new
one. Conditional upon the initial sentence, the commuted sentence varies only by the date in
which the first crime was committed, which in turn generates quasi-random variation in the
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expected future sentence. Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova exploit this source of variation to identify
the deterrence effect of the expected sentence on the probability of reincarceration, while Drago
and Galbiati (2012) allow such probability to depend also upon the residual sentence of an
inmate’s peers, defined as inmates of the same nationality serving time in the same prison.
We further extend their specification to allow for interactions in crime between different
communities. Specifically, for each individual in the treated group we form two distinct peer
groups, including, respectively, all inmates in the treated and control groups that served time in
the same prison. (We define analogously the peers of each individual in the control group.) A
negative coefficient for the average residual sentence of the peers from the other community
would suggest that peer effects go above and beyond the same nationality—i.e., that there are
complementarities in crime across nationalities. A positive coefficient would indicate instead that
inmates of a different nationality compete—i.e., there is substitution in criminal activity.
The results are presented in Table 8. Within our sample of new EU member and
candidate member countries, we do find that (conditional upon the initial sentence) one’s own
residual sentence length lowers the hazard rate of rearrest, but that the coefficients on the average
residual sentence of peers of the same nationality is not significantly different from zero (column
1). Only if we use a larger sample, including all foreign inmates, do we find that peer effects
within the same nationality matter (column 4). Most importantly for our purposes, the average
residual sentence of the peers who belong to the other group does not seem to matter at all. The
corresponding coefficient is never significantly different from zero, no matter whether we
control (columns 3 and 6) or not (columns 2 and 5) for the average sentence of the peers of the
same community. The coefficient is particularly small for our sample of new EU member and
candidate member countries (columns 2–3).

38

Table 8 Interactions In Criminal Activity between Treated and Controls, Estimates of Peer Effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Treatment and control group
All foreign inmates
Residual sentence
−0.015*
−0.014*
−0.015* −0.012*** −0.013*** −0.012***
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Peer residual sentence (same nationality)
0.010
0.011
−0.009**
−0.011**
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.005)
Peer residual sentence (other nationalities)
−0.001
−0.004
0.014
0.013
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.010)
Sentence
-0.007*
−0.006
−0.007*
−0.004** −0.005*** −0.004**
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Controls
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Observations
1,767
1,746
1,746
6,567
6,565
6,565
Pseudo R-sq.
0.0111
0.0103
0.0115
0.00689
0.00640
0.00699
N clusters
331
320
320
1,121
1,120
1,120
χ2
36.92
32.99
36.94
124.47
121.35
124.54
NOTE: The table shows hazard ratios of a Cox proportional hazard model. The sample for the first three columns includes all
inmates from new EU member and candidate member countries released after the July 2006 collective pardon. The remaining
columns use a sample that contains all foreign inmates. Robust standard errors clustered by Italian region and country of origin
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence, 95%
confidence, and 99% confidence levels.

The absence of direct interactions between inmates in the treated and control groups and
their peers in the other group does not exclude the possibility of other (indirect) influences in
equilibrium. For instance, the other communities could take on the criminal activities abandoned
by Romanians and Bulgarians, in which case our estimates would be upwardly biased;
alternatively, police forces could target these other communities more intensively after the
decrease in crime by Romanians and Bulgarians, in which case our estimates would be
downwardly biased. Figure 11 plots the change (between 2006 and 2007) in the number of
crimes committed by all Romanians in Italy against the same changes for the nationalities
included in the control group, for different types of crime. 24 A clearly positive correlation
emerges between the two. While we can hardly attach any causal interpretation to this finding,
this would hardly be consistent with strong substitution effects between the treated and control
groups. If the positive correlation was driven by complementarities, our estimated effects of legal
status would be biased toward zero.

24

These data are not available for Bulgarians and some other small foreign communities in the control

group.
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Figure 11 Criminal Offenses Committed by Immigrants from New EU Member and Candidate Member
Countries, Change over the 2006–2007 Period

NOTE: The figure plots the (percentage) change between 2006 and 2007 in the number of Romanians arrested in Italy for
different types of crimes against the same change for citizens of candidate member countries. The area of markers is proportional
to the total number of offenses committed in each category.
SOURCE: Ministry of Interior.

CONCLUSIONS
We use a natural experiment, namely the last round of the EU enlargement, to identify
the causal effect of legal status on immigrants’ crime, which is a priori unclear: On the one hand,
legal status may increase crime by precluding the expulsion of potential foreign criminals; on the
other, it lowers the propensity to engage in crime by providing immigrants with alternative
(legitimate) income opportunities. Evidence from a sample of former prison inmates released in
Italy a few months before the enlargement suggests that the second effect prevails. In particular,
the hazard rate of committing a crime decreases by about 50 percent after obtaining legal status
as a consequence of the EU enlargement.
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This is indeed a large effect. Still, it does not account for the entire difference in crime
rates between legal and illegal immigrants, as computed in the section “Crime Rates.” The
remaining part (between one-third and one-half) is likely driven by selection of immigrants into
legal status and differences in the probability of incarceration conditional upon having
committed a crime (which is constant across the pardoned inmates in our sample but may vary in
general between legal and illegal immigrants). This strengthens the argument for a quasiexperimental approach, in order to correctly identify the effect of legal status.
What about the external validity of our results? Admittedly, former prison inmates
represent a very peculiar group, so these findings cannot be easily generalized to the rest of the
immigrant population. But the great majority of people never engage in any type of serious
crime, which is why previous offenders represent an interesting sample to examine. This
segment of the population is more likely to lie at the margin between a criminal career and
legitimate activity, which is why recidivism studies form the bulk of the individual-level
evidence in the empirical crime literature (see, for instance, Witte [1980]; Lee and McCrary
[2009]).
From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that the consequences of migration policy
depend crucially on enforcement. Whatever level of migration quotas is fixed, it should be
enforced, in order to prevent the formation of a pocket of illegal immigrants with a very low
opportunity cost of engaging in crime. Since 2010, the United States has been speeding
deportations of convicted criminals while halting those of illegal immigrants without
convictions. According to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, in fiscal year
2011 just under 217,000 immigrants convicted of felonies or misdemeanors were deported,
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accounting for 55 percent of all deportations. 25 On top of their effect of incapacitating deportees
from committing future crimes in the country, such selective deportations are also likely to
represent additional deterrence against crime committed by immigrants.
Finally, we focus only on the effects of the EU enlargement on the criminal activity of
undocumented immigrants already in Italy before the enlargement. Changes in migration policy
have far-reaching consequences for the size and composition of migration inflows. In particular,
subsequent rounds of the EU enlargement or amnesties of formerly undocumented immigrants
are likely to attract new immigrants from abroad, whose characteristics may differ considerably
from those of previous migration waves. Policymakers would also need to estimate the costs and
benefits along this additional dimension; this, however, goes beyond the scope of the present
paper.
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